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Abstract
In a paper published in 1952 the French mathematician Georges-Théodule
Guilbaud has generalized Arrows impossibility result to the "logical prob-
lem of aggregation", thus anticipating the literature on abstract aggregation
theory and judgment aggregation. We reconstruct the proof of Guilbauds
theorem, which is also of technical interest, because it can be seen as the rst
use of ultralters in social choice theory.
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1 Introduction
Although ultralters have long been used in the proof of Arrows theorem (for
a survey see Monjardet 1983), in the emerging literature on judgment aggre-
gation1 this proof technique has been only recently exploited (see Gärdenfors
2006, Dietrich and Mongin 2007 (especially for the innite case), Klamler and
Eckert 2009 (for a simple proof of a central result in judgment aggregation),
Herzberg 2008 (for the use of ultraproducts), Daniels 2006, and Daniels and
Pacuit 2009, - the latter two papers in the di¤erent context of the logical for-
malization of judgment aggregation). This is allthemore astonishing as the
very rst application of an ultralter proof strategy to Arrows theorem can
be found in an early extension of this result to the aggregation of logically
interconnected propositions by the French mathematician Georges-Théodule
Guilbaud (1912-2008) in a paper on "Theories of the general interest and the
logical problem of aggregation" published in 1952.2
Unfortunately, Guilbaud gave only what he called an "intuitive" proof of
his main result (571, fn 1/48, fn 101)3. While its signicance is widely recog-
nized for being the rst use of an ultralter proof strategy in social choice
and its antecedence to results in judgment aggregation is forcefully argued
by Monjardet (2005), the latter only proved it for the case of preference
aggregation (Monjardet 2003). In the following two sections we give a re-
construction of Guilbauds main result and an explicit ultralter proof of his
theorem (Guilbaud only implicitly using the concept of ultralter). Section
4 provides historical details on the genesis of Guilbauds theorem, whereas
in section 5 we set this theorem in the context of the recent literature on
judgment aggregation.
2 Guilbauds theorem
Explicitly following the algebraic approach to logic underlying modern math-
ematical logic (534¤/23¤), Guilbaud formulates the "logical problem of ag-
gregation" in the algebraic framework of binary valuations of a set of sen-
tences in propositional logic. In particular, he considers "each individual
1See List and Puppe 2009 for a survey and the bibliography at:
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST/doctrinalparadox.htm
2For an unabriged english translation of Guilbauds paper see Guilbaud 2008, a drasti-
cally abridged translation (Guilbaud 1966) had remained almost unnoticed (see Monjardet
2008a).
3In (571, fn 1/48, fn 101), 571 is the corresponding page in Guilbauds (1952) original
paper, 48 the corresponding page in its english translation (2008), and fn 1 refers to
footnote 1.
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opinion as a system of judgments, that is, of a¢ rmations or negations, of ac-
ceptances or refusals, of a certain number of simple propositions" (535/23).
Logical connections between these propositions directly translating into re-
strictions on the set of admissible valuations (537/25), Guilbaud identies
the logical problem of aggregation as the problem of nding a rule which
assigns to each prole of individual opinions a logically consistent collective
opinion, i.e. an admissible valuation. Thus, Guilbauds approach is entirely
consistent with the literature on abstract aggregation theory (see Wilson
1975, Fishburn and Rubinstein 1986 and, for a survey, Day and McMor-
ris 2003), and on judgment aggregation (see especially Dokow and Holzman
2008) in the framework of which it can easily be reconstructed. In fact, Guil-
baud can be seen as a precursor of both strands of literature as we will show
in the discussion in section 5.
Let P = fp1; : : : ; pj; : : : ; pmg be an indexed set of m sentences in proposi-
tional logic, which constitutes the agenda of the collective decision problem.
For simplicity, the agenda will be identied with the index set f1; :::; j; :::;mg
of issues and a proposition pj will be identied with the j-th issue. A
valuation of the agenda P is a map P ! f0; 1g which assigns a truth
value to any proposition in the agenda. Algebraically, it is thus a vector
x = (x(1); :::; x(j); : : : ; x(m)) 2 f0; 1gP .
Given a set N = f1; :::; i; :::; ng of individuals, a prole is a map N !
f0; 1gP and it is denoted by x = (x1; :::; xi; : : : ; xn) 2 (f0; 1gP )N , where,
for every i 2 N , xi = (xi(1); :::; xi(j); : : : ; xi(m)) is the valuation of P by
individual i.
An aggregation rule is then a map f :
 f0; 1gP N ! f0; 1gP .
Clearly, if the propositions in the agenda are logically interconnected,
not all valuations are admissible (logically consistent). E.g. for an agenda
P = fp1; p2g where p1 implies p2 the valuation (1; 0) is inadmissible. In fact
to dene logical connections between the propositions of an agenda P comes
back to dene the setX  f0; 1gP of admissible valuations of the propositions
in P . In particular, as is familiar from the use of truth tables, the sixteen
elements of the power set of f0; 1g2 dene the sixteen logical connections
between two propositions p1 and p2. E.g. the set X = f(0; 0); (0; 1); (1; 1)g
of admissible valuations denes precisely the material implication p1 ! p2.
For a given agenda P , the subdomain of admissible valuations X 
f0; 1gP is closed under the aggregation rule f if f(XN)  X, that is if
the aggregation rule does not assign an inadmissible collective valuation to a
prole of admissible individual valuations. Guilbaud calls "Condorcet E¤ect"
(537/25) the fact that a particular subdomain may not be closed under the
aggregation rule. Then, and in particular under majority voting, the collec-
tive outcome may be an inadmissible valuation, i.e. a valuation which could
2
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not have been the opinion of any one (565/44). Thus, Guilbaud formulates
his "logical problem of aggregation" as the problem of identifying those ag-
gregation rules which guarantee closure of relevant subdomains, i.e. domains
that correspond to an agenda of logically interconnected propositions (the
domain X = f0; 1gP corresponding to an agenda of logically completely in-
dependent propositions being trivially closed under any aggregation rule). In
particular, an aggregation rule is called acceptable by Guilbaud (559/40),
if for every agenda P the corresponding subdomain of admissible valuations
X  f0; 1gP is closed.
Similarly to the social choice literature, Guilbaud stresses the signicance
of independence and neutrality conditions for aggregation rules. In fact, he
claims that the collective valuation of any issue should only depend on the
individual valuations of that issue and that this pattern of dependence should
be the same for all issues, a property known as systematicity in the literature
on judgment aggregation.
However, unlike Arrow in his formulation of the condition of independence
of irrelevant alternatives, Guilbaud does not justify these invariance proper-
ties by the requirement that the availability of a third alternative should not
alter the choice between any two alternatives but rather justies the strong
condition of systematicity by the second order problem of collectively identi-
fying and establishing any relevant additional information to the individual
valuations of a given issue. In Guilbauds view, this implicitly denes new
issues and thus, requires the introduction of additional "idealvoters (. . . )
whose task is to qualify the ballot by their answers" (569/46).
Let x 2 (f0; 1gP )N be a prole, j an issue and v 2 f0; 1g a truth value;
the subset of individuals
xj(v) := fi 2 N : xi(j) = vg
is the set of individuals that assign the valuation v to the issue j. Denoting
for any judgment aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP by fj the j-th
component of f , i.e. the function fj : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1g that assigns to
any prole of individual valuations the social valuation of the issue j, the
following invariance conditions can be dened.
Denition 1 An aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP is independent
if for any issue j 2 P , any valuation v 2 f0; 1g, and for all proles x; x0 2
(f0; 1gP )N
fj(x) = v )
h
xj(v) = x
0
j(v)) fj(x
0
) = v
i
.
An aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP is neutral if for all issues
3
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k; l 2 P fk = fl.
An aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP is systematic if it is indepen-
dent and neutral.
Given an aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP , let us say that a
set of individuals U 2 2N is a winning coalition for an issue j 2 P , a
valuation v 2 f0; 1g and a prole x 2 (f0; 1gP )N if fj(x) = v. Then, observe
that when the aggregation rule f is independent the set U is also a winning
coalition for j, v and any prole x
0 2 (f0; 1gP )N such that x0j(v) = xj(v).
Thus, an independent aggregation rule can be characterised by identifying
for any issue j 2 P and any valuation v 2 f0; 1g the family Wvj = fU 2 2N :
xj(v) = U ) fj(x) = vg, i.e. the family of all coalitions that are winning for
a given issue and a given valuation. One says that these families of winning
coalitions are induced by the aggregation rule f .
Observe that for any issue j 2 P , the families W1j and W0j are co-dual
in the sense that for any valuation v 2 f0; 1g and any coalition U 2 2N ,
U 2 Wvj if and only if NnU =2 W1 vj .
Systematicity then simply translates into the condition Wvk =Wvl =Wv
for all issues k; l 2 P and any given valuation v 2 f0; 1g. So, when the
aggregation rule f is systematic, there exists two families W0 and W1 of
subsets of N such that for any issue j 2 P , for any valuation v 2 f0; 1g, and
for any prole x 2 (f0; 1gP )N ,
fj(x) = v if and only if xj(v) 2 Wv.
Otherwise said, a winning coalition for a valuation v 2 f0; 1g, i.e. a member
of Wv, is a winning coalition for any issue.
The central part of Guilbauds argumentation consists in showing how the
acceptability condition of closure of all the subdomains of admissible valua-
tions under a systematic judgment aggregation rule translates into conditions
on its induced families of winning coalitions, which ultimately amount to a
dictatorship.
Denition 2 An aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP is dictatorial
(or is a dictatorship) if there exists an individual i 2 N such that Wvk =
Wvl = fU 2 2N : i 2 Ug for all issues k; l 2 P and any valuation v 2 f0; 1g.
Observe that this denition is equivalent to the usual one in terms of
the projection of the space of proles on one of its components, i.e. the
characteristics of a particular individual, which then is the dictator
One can now state Guilbauds theorem:
4
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Theorem 3 (Guilbaud 1952) A systematic aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N !
f0; 1gP for an agenda with more than a single pair of propositions is accept-
able (i.e. for any X  f0; 1gP X is closed under f) if and only if it is
dictatorial.
We will give Guilbauds proof of this theorem below. For his demon-
stration Guilbaud establishes and proves several results about the induced
families of winning coalitions. In particular, he establishes the following
properties of winning coalitions for systematic aggregation rules.
Denition 4 A coalition U 2 2N is e¢ cient if U 2 W v implies U 2 W 1 v
for any valuation v 2 f0; 1g, i.e. if it is winning for both valuations of any
issue.
The fact that the winning coalitions induced by systematic aggregation
rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP are e¢ cient means that W0 = W1 = W, i.e.
that such a rule is given for any issue j 2 P , any valuation v 2 f0; 1g, and
for any prole x 2 (f0; 1gP )N by
fj(x) = v if and only if xi(j) 2 W.
The other important property of winning coalitions shown by Guilbaud is
their monotonicity property of closure under supersets. Since this property
characterises the families of coalitions known as simple games, it allows Guil-
baud to explicitly apply this concept to the analysis of acceptable systematic
aggregation rules4. Guilbaud shows also other properties - given below - of
the simple games induced by systematic aggregation rules.
Denition 5 A simple game on the set N of individuals is a collection
W  2N of subsets of N such that for all U; V 2 2N ,
if U 2 W and U  V , then V 2 W.
A simple game is proper if for any U 2 2N , U 2 W ) NnU =2 W.
A simple game is strong if for any U 2 2N , U =2 W ) NnU 2 W.
Finally, when a (systematic) aggregation rule is dened by a set of (e¢ -
cient) winning coalitions forming a proper and strong simple game Guilbaud
says that it is a rule of majority "in the broad sense" (563/42f), as it gen-
eralizes the partition of the sets of coalitions into winning and non-winning
4Guilbaud quotes von Neumann and Morgensterns (1944) book where simple games are
dened. Observe nevertheless that von Neumann and Morgensterns denition corresponds
to what is now called a proper and strong simple game, and excludes what they call the
trivial case where W = fU 2 2N : i 2 Ug for some i 2 N , i.e. precisely a dictatorial
situation.
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coalitions that any majority threshold establishes. Intuitively, this is also the
reason for the applicability of the ultralter concept which aims precisely at
partitioning a power set into "large" and "small" subsets.
Guilbaud establishes his theorem with the help of the following lemma:
Lemma 6 (Guilbaud 1952) A systematic aggregation rule is acceptable for
any pair of propositions fk; lg  P and for any agenda P if and only if it
is a rule of majority in the broad sense, i.e. if there exists a proper and
strong simple game W  2N such that for any issue j 2 fk; lg, any valuation
v 2 f0; 1g and any prole x 2 (f0; 1gP )N
fj(x) = v , fi 2 N : xi(j) = vg 2 W.
In order to prove this lemma Guilbaud rst observes that since the ag-
gregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1gP is systematic, i.e. the function
fj : (f0; 1gP )N ! f0; 1g does not depend on the valuation of other issues
than j and is the same for each issue j 2 P , it is su¢ cient to consider a
single function from f0; 1gN into f0; 1g which, in a slight abuse of notation,
we still denote by f .
Guilbaud proves his lemma by establishing necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tions for the preservation of any logical connection between two propositions
p1 and p2 by a systematic aggregation rule. He starts by considering the four
logical connectives which are determined by all the three element subsets of
the power set of f0; 1g2. These are the material implication (for which (1; 0)
is inadmissible), the converse implication (for which (0; 1) is inadmissible),
the alternative denial (NAND) and the disjunction (for which (1; 1) resp.
(0; 0) are inadmissible).
Beginning with the material implication, Guilbaud establishes a neces-
sary and su¢ cient condition for the preservation of the implication p1 ! p2,
i.e. the exclusion of the inadmissible valuation (1; 0). Observe that if the
valuation (1; 0) is inadmissible, this implies for all proles of admissible val-
uations x 2 XN = [f0; 1g2n(1; 0)]N that x1(1) = fi 2 N : xi(p1) = 1g 
x2(1) = fi 2 N : xi(p2) = 1g.
Thus the exclusion of the inadmissible valuation (1; 0) requires the avoid-
ance of the following coincidence ("rencontre des deux faits", 558/39) for any
prole x 2 (f0; 1gP )N
(1) x1(1)  x2(1)
(2) f1(x) = 1 and f2(x) = 0, or equivalently, given independence, x1(1) 2
W1 and x2(0) 2 W0.
Hence, Guilbaud establishes as a necessary and su¢ cient condition for
the preservation of the implication p1 ! p2 the following for all proles
x 2 (f0; 1gP )N :
6
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If x1(1) 2 W1 and x2(0) 2 W0 then x1(1) * x2(1),
or, still by independence, and for any coalition W 2 2N ,
if W 2 W1, then W * NnV for all V 2 W0.
Given the correspondence between logical connectives and sets of ad-
missible valuations X  f0; 1g2, it is straightforward to see (559, fn 1/39,
fn 89) that to preserve any logical connection between two propositions
comes back to satisfy the following condition for the exclusion of any val-
uation fv; v0g 2 f0; 1g2 in the corresponding set of inadmissible valuations
f0; 1g2nX:
(General exclusion condition) For any inadmissible valuation (v; v0) 2
f0; 1g2 and any prole x 2 (f0; 1gP )N , if x1(v) 2 Wv and x2(v0) 2 Wv0, then
x1(v)  x2(1  v0),
or, by independence, and for any coalition W 2 2N
if W 2 Wv, then W  NnV for all V 2 Wv0.
This exclusion condition is thus a necessary and su¢ cient condition in
order that a systematic aggregation rule preserves all the logical connections
between two propositions.
The application of this exclusion condition together with other properties
readily establishes the following properties of winning coalitions:
To show that all winning coalitions must be e¢ cient (559f/40), Guilbaud
considers two propositions such that p1 $ :p2 and the corresponding valua-
tions are "contradictory", i.e. x1(v) = x2(1  v) for any valuation v 2 f0; 1g
and for any prole x 2 (f0; 1gP )N . Clearly, by the exclusion condition, if
x1(v) = x2(1   v) 2 Wv then Nnx2(1   v) =2 Wv and hence by co-duality
x2(1  v) = x1(v) 2 W1 v, i.e. any winning coalition for a valuation v is also
winning for the valuation 1  v.
Guilbaud then proceeds to show that the family W =W1 = W0 of ef-
cient coalitions is closed under supersets, i.e. that W is a simple game
(560/40). This follows from the exclusion condition by an easy proof by con-
tradiction: Assume to the contrary that for some winning coalition W 2 W
there exists a superset U of W which is not a winning coalition (i.e. W  U ,
but U =2 W, and hence NnU 2 W). The exclusion condition now requires
that NnU  NnW which contradicts the assumption that W  U .
Finally, it follows from e¢ ciency together with co-duality that the induced
family of winning coalitions is a strong and proper simple game (561/41).
Now, to show that an acceptable systematic aggregation rule for an
agenda with at least three propositions is dictatorial, it su¢ ces to show that
the strong and simple game W induced by such an aggregation rule has the
form W = fU 2 2N : i 2 Ug for some individual i 2 N , - the dictator.
This is done by Guilbaud by identifying an essential condition for the
acceptability of a systematic aggregation rule, the violation of which is re-
7
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sponsible for the "Condorcet e¤ect":
Denition 7 A collection W  2N satises the intersecting triple prop-
erty if for all U; V;W 2 W, U \ V \W 6= ;.
Observe that this property is equivalent to the condition that the Naka-
mura number5 of the collectionW be strictly larger than three (see Monjardet
2003).
This condition is also intuitively very plausible as its violation directly
leads to the "Condorcet e¤ect", i.e. to a social outcome that cannot be the
valuation of any single individual because it is inadmissible.
Guilbaud proves his theorem in three steps (565-567/43-45):
(i) The family W of winning coalitions satises the intersecting triple
property.
Indeed, consider any inadmissible valuation (vk; vl; vm) of three proposi-
tions pk; pl; pm 2 P . Unless this intersection property holds, one can take
three coalitions with empty intersection and construct a prole such that
fx(vk); x(vl); x(vm)g  W leading to the inadmissible valuation (vk; vl; vm).
(ii) The family W is closed under intersection.
First, by the intersecting triple property, the intersection of any two win-
ning coalitions is non empty. Now if the intersection of two winning coalitions
U; V 2 W is not a winning coalition, its complement NnU\V must be a win-
ning coalition, which in turn implies the existence of three winning coalitions
with empty intersection U \ V \ (NnU \ V ) = ;, a contradiction.
iii) The family of winning coalitions has the form W = fU 2 2N : i 2 Ug
for some individual i 2 N , - the dictator.
Since W is closed under intersection, the intersection T
W2W
W of all the
winning coalitions is a winning coalition and it is the minimal winning coali-
tion. Assume that
T
W2W
W is not a singleton and thus contains a proper
subset S  T
W2W
W . But this implies NnS 2 W and hence (\W )\ (NnS) =
\(WnS) 2 W by intersection closure. Thus, T
W2W
W cannot be a minimal
winning coalition unless it is a singleton, which completes the proof of dicta-
torship of any acceptable aggregation rule for an agenda with at least three
propositions.
Remark 8 Guilbauds theorem allows to deduce Arrows theorem for the case
of linear orders. One knows that Arrow assumes the condition of indepen-
dence in his theorem: the neutrality of an independent social welfare function
5The Nakamura number of a collection W  2N of subsets of N is the cardinality of
the smallest subset of W with empty intersection.
8
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then follows from the assumptions of the Pareto property, the surjectivity of
the social welfare function and the transitivity of the social preference. Guil-
baud, him, directly assumes the strong condition of systematicity of the aggre-
gation rule. But this assumption is not as restrictive as it appears, because it
follows similarly from independence together with the acceptability condition
that an aggregation rule preserves all logical connections between any two
propositions. To see this, simply consider two propositions pk and pl such
that pk $ pl, in which case it is easily seen that an independent aggregation
rule must also be neutral, and thus systematic, in order to be acceptable for
any pair of propositions.
3 A simple ultralter proof of Guilbauds the-
orem
Guilbauds own proof only implicitly uses the concept of ultralter and we
will see in section 4 why he did not explicitly use it. In the following, we give
an explicit and simple ultralter proof of his theorem. We begin by recalling
some denitions.
Denition 9 A lter on a set N is a collection F  2N of subsets of N
such that
(i) N 2 F and ; =2 F (non-triviality)
(ii) for all U; V 2 2N , U 2 F and V 2 F ) U \ V 2 F (closure under
intersection
(iii) for all U; V 2 2N , U 2 F and U  V ) V 2 F (closure under super-
sets).
A lter W on N is a principal lter if it is a collection W = fU 2 2N :
S  Ug for some non-empty subset S of N .
An ultralter is a maximal lter, i.e. a lter not strictly contained in an-
other lter.
It is well known that if N is nite every lter on N is a principal lter,
and thus every ultralter is a collection W = fU 2 2N : i 2 Ug for some
i 2 N .
By the monotonicity property of closure under supersets a lter is also
a simple game, which allows to use Monjardets (1978) characterization of
ultralters6 to obtain the following lemma.
6Monjardet (1978) shows that a collection W  2N of subsets of N is an ultralter
if and only if it satises the intersecting triple property and the property that for any
U 2 2N , U =2 W ) NnU 2 W. Observe that for collections which are simple games the
latter property denes a strong simple game.
9
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Lemma 10 (Monjardet 2003) If a familyW of subsets of a set N is a strong
simple game which satises the intersecting triple property, it is an ultralter.
This yields a particularly simple ultralter proof of Guilbauds theorem.
Proof. From Guilbauds lemma we know that a family W  2N of winning
coalitions which is induced by an acceptable aggregation rule is a strong
and proper simple game on N . But for a systematic aggregation rule to be
acceptable for an agenda with at least three propositions, its induced family
of winning coalitions also needs to satisfy the intersecting triple property,
and thus, by Monjardets lemma, is an ultralter. Finally, as N is nite, W
is a principal lter and thus has the form fU  N : i 2 Ug for some i 2 N ,
- the dictator.
4 Historical Note
We will succesively examine three points: the genesis of Guilbauds 1952
paper, the genesis of Guilbauds theorem on judgment aggregation, and the
origins of the ultralter proofs in social choice theory.
Guilbauds theorem on judgment aggregation is contained in his paper
Les théories de lintérêt général et le problème logique de lagrégation (Theo-
ries of the general interest and the logical problem of aggregation). In order
to understand the genesis of this paper we must put together some biograph-
ical and scientic facts7. Guilbaud, after his studies of mathematics at the
Ecole Normale Supérieure (1932-1935), was rst teacher of in classes of high
mathematics8 at Metz, Brest then Dijon (1941-1947). From 1942 to 1947
he also did lectures on the philosophy of sciences at the "Faculté des let-
tres et sciences humaines" of Dijon. Guilbaud was interested by the use of
mathematics in Economics and more generally in Social Sciences. So he read
classics like Condorcet, Cournot or Pareto. Gilles-Gaston Granger comes at
Dijon in 1943 as professor of philosophy and both begin a friendship where
in particular they speak about Condorcets "Mathématique Sociale"9. In
1947 Guilbaud becomes member of the "Institut des Sciences Économiques
7Guilbaud died in 2008 and a special issue of Mathématiques et Sciences humaines (no.
183, 2008) contains his biography and his publications (URL:http://www.ehess.fr/revue-
msh/recherche.php?numero=183).
8These classes prepare students for the competitive examinations allowing the entrance
in a "Grande Ecole" like the Ecole Polytechnique or the Ecole Normale Supérieure.
9Granger writes in the introduction of his book "La mathématique sociale du marquis
de Condorcet" (Paris, 1956) and which was his "Thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat ès
lettres": "Je dois à mon collègue et ami G.-Th. Guilbaud, outre des suggestions toujours
fécondes, lidée même détudier Condorcet" (p. x).
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Appliquées (ISEA)" of François Perroux where he works as mathematician,
statistician and economist up to 1955. Arrow sends him a preprint of his 1951
book Social Choice and Individual Values. Guilbaud is surprised to see that
Arrow doesnt know that the "voting paradox" is due to Condorcet. Mean-
while, Arrow is invited by Perroux at the ISEA to make a presentation of his
work. His lecture entitled The rationality principle in collective decisions is
given on June 1952 and is published in a special issue of Économie appliquée10
devoted to welfare economics and called Lavantage collectif. Guilbauds pa-
per -certainly motivated by Arrows coming- is in this same issue.
This paper contains many interesting results and perspectives on aggre-
gation problems11. In particular, Guilbaud dragged from the deep oblivion
where it had fallen Condorcets Essai sur lapplication de lanalyse à la prob-
abilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix (Paris, 1785)12. Indeed,
the Essai had been read only by a few contemporaries including the mathe-
maticians Sylvestre-Francois Lacroix and Simon Lhuilier or the politician and
historian Pierre Claude Francois Daunou. But later in France reputed math-
ematicians like Joseph Louis Francois Bertrand in his Calcul des probabilités
(Paris, 1888/89) found the book unreadable and anyway without interest,
an opinion shared by the main 19th century historian of mathematics Isaac
Todhunter who at least had read the Essai13. Guilbaud was the rst to read
again the Essai and to understand the logical problem raised by Condorcet
through his sometimes enough confuse probabilistic approach.
Indeed, Condorcets aim in the Essai is to nd the method which maxi-
mizes the probability to get the truth when a collectivity must determine it
by a voting procedure. The truth can be the culpability or not of a defendant
when the collectivity is a court or the best candidate when the collectivity is
a recruitment jury. In such cases, the voters must give what Condorcet calls
an opinion ("avis") on the decision to take. According to Condorcet this
opinion can and must always be decomposed in a sequence of answers TRUE
or FALSE to binary propositions (equivalently, in a sequence of answers YES
or NO to binary questions)14. For instance, in the case of candidates, the
10Économie appliquée 5(4): 469-484 (October-December 1952).
11An analysis of this paper can be found in Monjardet 2005.
12For a partial english translation with an introduction into Condorcets work see Con-
dorcet 1994.
13In his book "A history of the mathematical theory of probability from the time of
Pascal to that of Laplace" (London, 1865) Todhunter devotes a chapter to a detailed
analysis of the Essai but he completely misses the signicance of Condorcets study on the
systems of propositions and their possible contradictions ("these results however appear
of too little value to detain us any longer", p. 375).
14Condorcets formulation is : "chaque avis est une combinaison de propositions simples
et de leurs contradictoires" (Essai, Discours préliminaire, p. 45).
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opinion of a voter can be a (strict) ranking of the candidates and it is decom-
posed in a sequence of answers to the questions: is candidate A better than
candidate B? Now, Condorcet argues that the collective decision must be
obtained by taking the opinion resulting of the majority decisions obtained
on each question. And he shows a rst "paradox": this opinion is not neces-
sarily the opinion obtained by the "plurality" (i.e. the opinion obtaining the
greatest number of votes). In fact "en prenant la décision à la pluralité entre
les avis à la manière ordinaire, on pourrait adopter lavis de la minorité" ("by
taking the decision between the opinions by the usual plurality method, it
would be possible to adopt the minority opinion", Essai, p. 115). On the
other hand, Condorcet observes that the propositions can be linked like in
the following example where they are incompatible (Essai, Discours prélim-
inaire, p. 50-51): the rst proposition is p = "il est prouvé que laccusé est
coupable" and the second is q = "il est prouvé que laccusé est innocent".
Now, Condorcet assumes that there are 11 opinions p and nonq, 7 opinions
nonp and qand 6 opinions nonp and nonq. In this case the opinion hav-
ing the plurality is p and nonq, whereas the opinion obtained by using the
majority rule on each of the two propositions is nonp and nonq.
In the case of preferences agregation Condorcets majority method used
on each pairwise comparison between two alternatives leads him to discover
the "Condorcet e¤ect" (the paradox of voting): the binary majority pref-
erences do not necessarily yield a ranking, they may lead to a cycle. Now,
Guilbaud observes that the problem is more general and has been already
encountered for instance in the case of Quetelets "homme moyen"15. The
problem occurs each time that one applies -like Condorcet- a component-wise
method of aggregation of complex objects. It consists rst of decomposing
complex objects into their simple elements, then of applying to each series of
such elements an aggregation operator like the mean or the median (the ma-
jority rule comes back to take a median). By denition an essential property
of this method is its property of independence: each series of simple elements
is aggregated (by the same or by di¤erent operators) independently of the
other series. Now as soon as the complex objects considered satisfy some
relations between their simple elements, the aggregated complex object does
not necessarily satisfy these same relations.16 In the case of preference aggre-
gation, Arrow proved that the apparition of Condorcet e¤ects is unavoidable
15See Guilbauds paper or Monjardet 2005 for details.
16One can observe that it is exactly this situation which happens in the so-called "doc-
trinal paradox" (see the following section). Here one has several propositions logically
linked and that judges -respecting these links- can nd true or false. But when one takes
the majority answers to each proposition it is possible to get a result not satisfying the
logical links.
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in the sense that in order to avoid it one must take a "dictatorial" aggrega-
tion procedure or sacrify another desirable property of the aggregation rule.
It is certainly the reading of the Essai and of Arrows result that motivated
Guilbaud to consider a more general case and then to get his theorem on
judment aggregation.
In the proof of his theoremGuilbaud does not use the term ultralter. But
it su¢ ces to read his proof to see that "followers of Bourbaki will notice an
ultralter in the background" as Blau (1979, p. 202) would have said and as
it was observed by Monjardet (1969, p. 180): "Il est alors immédiat que dans
lalgèbre de Boole des parties de N, la famille [des ensembles décisifs] doit
être un ltre maximal" ("then it is immediate that in the Boolean algebra
of subsets of N, the family [of decisive sets] must be a maximal lter).
In handwritten notes concerning his 1952 paper sent to one of us Guilbaud
explains: "I could have pointed out Henri Cartans lters17. But rstly I have
found this allusion too pompous and secondly for Cartan the lters were a
mean to get rid of the plague of countable. So, it concerns essentially the
innite, what was out of the topic".
It is interesting to observe that the rediscovery of the use of ultralter in
the proof of Arrows theorem occured precisely after that Fishburn noticed
in 1970 that the dictatorship result does not hold in the case of an innite
population of voters (assuming the Axiom of Choice): Then Hansson (1976)
in a paper written in 1971, and Kirman and Sondermann (1972) gave an
ultralter proof of Arrows theorem by showing that the collection of decisive
coalitions induced by a social welfare function satisfying Arrows other axioms
is an ultralter. The dictatorship result then immediately follows from the
well-known fact that a ultralter on a nite set is principal, i.e. the collection
of all supersets of some singleton. After this rediscovery ultralter proofs were
often used for impossibility (or possibility) theorems in social choice theory
and in the recent literature on judgment aggregation.
5 Judgment aggregation and Guilbauds the-
orem
Interestingly, the recent literature on judgment aggregation originates in a
paradox which arises in the same legal context of aggregating the opinions of
a court of several judges into a collective decision that motivated Condorcets
17Henri Cartan was the creator of the notion of lter. See his two 1937 Comptes rendus
à lAcadémie des Sciences de Paris, "Théorie des ltres" (205, p. 595-598) and "Filtres et
ultraltres" (205, p. 777-779).
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analysis: the doctrinal paradox (Kornhauser and Sager 1986). This paradox
owes its name to the logical connections between the issues established by
legal doctrine: In particular, in a contract case a defendant is liable (L)
if and only if there was a valid contract (C) and a material breach (B) of
that contract. Thus, the verdict L is equivalent to the conjunction of two
propositions.
How easily majority voting can lead to a logically inconsistent outcome
is seen from the following table18:
C B L
Judge 1 1 1 1
Judge 2 0 1 0
Judge 3 1 0 0
Court 1 1 0
In fact, the rst theorem in the literature on judgment aggregation by List
and Pettit (2002) is a straightforward generalization of the doctrinal para-
dox. This theorem was originally not formulated in the framework of binary
valuations, but of the aggregation of judgment sets and uses the stronger
property of anonymity instead of non-dictatorship.19
Theorem 11 (List and Pettit 2002) If for two atomic propositions pk, pl an
agenda P also contains the conjunction pk ^ pl (where ^ could be replaced
by _ or !), there exists no systematic and anonymous aggregation rule f :
XN ! f0; 1gP such that the set X  f0; 1gP of admissible valuations of the
agenda P is closed.
Observe that an equivalent formulation of Guilbauds theorem is that
there exists no systematic and non-dictatorial aggregation rule f : (f0; 1gP )N !
f0; 1gP under which the subdomain X  f0; 1gP of admissible valuations for
any agenda P is closed.
Although the non-dictatorship property used by Guilbaud is weaker than
the property of anonymity used in List and Pettits impossibility theorem,
18In fact, the legal literature on the doctrinal paradox was more interested in the dis-
crepancy between the outcome of majority voting on the premises and the outcome of
majority voting on the conclusion.
19For the below reformulation of this theorem in the framework of propositional valua-
tions (as well as for a generalization of it) see Pauly and van Hees 2006. The properties
of completeness, consistency, and deductive closure dened for individual and collective
judgment sets, i.e. subsets of a set P of propositions then directly translate into the condi-
tion that the domain of admissible valuations X  f0; 1gP be closed under the aggregation
rule.
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Guilbauds theorem cannot be considered to be stronger, because his accept-
ability condition is the strongest possible agenda condition: it requires the
closure of the domain of admissible valuations for any agenda.
Thus the signicance of Guilbauds theorem does not consist in the strength
of the result, but in the strength and originality of his approach: Long before
Wilson (1975, p. 89)) asked the question "whether procedures for aggregat-
ing attributes other than preferences are subject to similar restrictions" than
Arrows theorem, which initiated the literature on abstract aggregation the-
ory, and even longer before the recent literature on judgment aggregation
Guilbaud generalized Arrows theorem to the "logical problem of aggrega-
tion". Like Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) for abstract aggregation theory
and later Dokow and Holzman (2008) for judgment aggregation he formu-
lated this problem in an algebraic framework. But above all, he addressed
this problem with the powerful tools of ultralters long before they were even
used in the theory of preference aggregation.
A classical escape route from Arrovian impossibility results consists in
domain restrictions. For particular domain restrictions it can be shown that
majority rule never induces a "Condorcet e¤ect". Dietrich and List (2007)
provide several domain restrictions that guarantee logically consistent judg-
ments under majority rule. In particular, they show that one can get such
domains when the (set of propositions of the) agenda is linearly ordered. This
result is similar to Blacks single-peakedness condition in preference aggrega-
tion. In his paper, Guilbaud devotes several pages (540¤/26¤) to a study of
this last condition. He shows that this comes back to dene a (partial) order
on the set of the pairwise comparisons x > y and that the linear orders satisfy-
ing Blacks condition correspond to the up-sets of this order. So by Birkho¤s
duality between posets and distributive lattices the set of these linear orders
is a distributive lattice. But since (as it is or it should be well-known that)
majority rule coincides with the median operation in a distributive lattice,
the set of these linear orders is closed under majority rule.20 In this way,
Guilbauds remarks on Blacks condition also anticipated the main domain
restriction in preference aggregation (see Monjardet 2008c). Indeed, allmost
all restricted domains are distributive lattices dened from particular partial
orders on the pairwise comparisons (see Galambos and Reiner 2006, Mon-
jardet 2008b). Moreover, it is easy to see that Guilbauds observation can be
extended to judgment aggregation. As soon as there exists a partial order on
the agenda, the set of admissible valuations corresponds to the distributive
lattice of the down-sets of this poset and then majority rule always provides
20See, for instance, Hudry et al 2009 or Monjardet 2008b for the link between majority
rule and the median operation in distributive lattices.
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an admissible valuation.
6 Conclusion
In 1952, almost immediately after the publication of Arrows seminal book in
1951, the French mathematician Georges-Théodule Guilbaud published an
article in a special issue of the French review Economie Appliquée dedicated
to welfare economics which anticipated both the use of ultralters in social
choice theory and the more recent attempts to extend this area from the the-
ory of preference aggregation to abstract aggregation theory and judgment
aggregation in particular. This article published in French remained almost
unnoticed, although Arrow himself acknowledged it as a "remarkable exposi-
tion of the theory of collective choice and the general problem of aggregation"
in the second edition of his book (Arrow 1963, p. 92). This phenomenon de-
serves further investigation as a case of multiple discoveries due to language
barriers21, but interestingly not even a partial translation of this article in
1966 was able to attract due attention22. This might be seen as evidence for
deeper barriers impeding scientic communication even in highly formalized
areas of the social sciences.
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